University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Carey Law
2020

Management-Based Regulation
Cary Coglianese
University of Pennsylvania Law School

Shana M. Starobin
Bowdoin College

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons,
Economic Policy Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Environmental Policy Commons, Law and
Economics Commons, Law and Society Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons,
Public Administration Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the Strategic Management
Policy Commons

Repository Citation
Coglianese, Cary and Starobin, Shana M., "Management-Based Regulation" (2020). Faculty Scholarship at
Penn Carey Law. 2226.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2226

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Carey Law by an authorized administrator of Penn
Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

Management-Based Regulation
Cary Coglianese* and Shana Starobin**
Abstract
Environmental regulators have embraced management-based regulation as a
flexible instrument for addressing a range of important problems often poorly
addressed by other types of regulations. Under management-based regulation,
regulated firms must engage in management-related activities oriented toward
addressing targeted problems—such as planning and analysis to mitigate risk and the
implementation of internal management systems geared towards continuous
improvement. In contrast with more restrictive forms of regulation which can impose
one-size-fits-all solutions, management-based regulation offers firms greater
operational choice about how to solve regulatory problems, leveraging firms’ internal
informational advantage to innovate and search for alternative measures to achieve the
intended results more cost-effectively. Drawing on both illustrative cases of
management-based regulation and on available empirical research, this chapter
explains management-based regulation’s relative advantages and disadvantages as well
as the likely conditions for its effective use.
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Management-Based Regulation
Cary Coglianese and Shana Starobin
Management-based regulation has received greater use by regulators than it has
systematic study by researchers. Yet experience with it to date—confirmed by the
limited empirical study of it that does exist1 —indicates that management-based
regulation can prove to be a viable instrument in the policymaker’s toolbox and one
that may be most appropriate for addressing a non-trivial range of regulatory problems,
such as pollution, catastrophic industrial accidents, and foodborne illnesses. But what
exactly is management-based regulation? How and when does it work? And what are
its limitations—especially given that it often seems to target problems that are poorly
addressed by other available policy instruments?
I. What is Management-Based Regulation?
Management-based regulation, as the name implies, mandates that regulated
firms’ managers engage in management activities, such as planning and analysis,
oriented toward addressing the underlying problem motivating the regulation. This
regulatory strategy has been defined as one that requires regulated entities:
to produce plans or adopt management systems that comply with criteria
stated by the regulator, such as to identify hazards, develop options for risk
mitigation, establish procedures for monitoring and correcting problems,
train employees in these procedures, and develop measures for evaluating
and continuously improving the firm’s management with respect to the
stated social objective.2
Management-based regulation often stands in contrast to traditional forms of
regulation—or ‘command and control’ regulation. Stereotypically, these traditional
forms of regulation are highly restrictive: they constrain firm choice not only about
which problems to solve but also exactly how they must solve them. By imposing onesize fits all solutions on all firms, traditional regulation results in higher costs because
firms have no flexibility to innovate or search for alternative measures to achieve the
intended results. Moreover, traditional forms of regulation emanate from regulators
1

Cary Coglianese and David Lazer, ‘Management-based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management
to Achieve Public Goals’ (2003) 37(4) L & Soc’y Rev 691-730; Lori S. Bennear, ‘Evaluating
Management-Based Regulation: A Valuable Tool in the Regulatory Toolbox?’ in Cary Coglianese and
Jennifer Nash (eds), Leveraging the Private Sector: Management-Based Strategies for Improving
Environmental Performance 51-86 (Resources for the Future Press 2006).
2
Cary Coglianese, ‘Management-Based Regulation: Implications for Public Policy,’ in Gregory Bounds
and Nikolai Malyshev (eds), Risk and Regulatory Policy: Improving the Governance of Risk 159-183
(OECD Publishing 2010).
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who inherently have less access to information about regulated firms’ internal
operations than the firms do. In principle, management-based regulation overcomes
these limitations of traditional regulation. Management-based regulation seeks to
leverage the firms’ informational advantage as well as provide flexibility to adapt
solutions to each firm’s circumstances so as to increase effectiveness and reduce
compliance costs.3
Management-based regulation can be adopted by any kind of regulatory
authority.4 What makes it distinctive is the nature of its command—that is, what it tells
a regulated entity to do. Traditional regulatory commands take the form of either means
or ends—instructing regulated firms to undertake (or avoid) certain actions (for
example, install emissions control devices), or to achieve (or avoid) specific outcomes
linked to regulatory goals (for example, keep concentrations of air pollutants below a
designated level). By contrast, management-based regulation has been said to force
regulated entities to ‘think’—compelling efforts at planning and internal operational
decision-making. 5 Instead of telling a firm what action to take that will directly achieve
a regulatory goal, such as installing pollution control equipment, a management-based
rule tells firms to take actions that aim at achieving the regulatory goal by improving
firms’ management. Such a rule requires firms to analyze their operations and come up
with their own internal plans and procedures aimed at making improvements that will
advance the regulatory goal. What is required is management activity: planning,
analysis, and the adoption of internal systems and procedures.6 Some managementbased rules do not even require that regulated firms actually implement their internal
plans and procedures, just that they develop them.
With management-based regulation, firms retain what has been called the
‘locus of discretion.’7 In other words, firms can still decide what direct or immediate
actions to take to solve the regulatory problem. For this reason, management-based
regulation is sometimes confused with other regulatory strategies that similarly leave
regulated firms with discretion, such as performance-based regulation, voluntary
programs, or self-regulation.8 Management-based regulation does share some affinities
with self-regulation because, under management-based rules, firms do develop their

3
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own internal procedures and implementation plans to remedy problems.9 Since firms
themselves decide what internal procedures to adopt and direct actions to take,
management-based regulation can be more cost-effective than other strategies and may
promote firm compliance in addition to reducing government resources dedicated to
inspections and compliance. Yet, unlike self-regulation, management-based regulation
is indeed a form of mandatory regulation—placing obligations upon firms to undertake
analysis, planning, and management practices. Self-regulation in its various forms
typically lacks monitoring and enforcement, beyond internal measures undertaken
within the firm; it is purely voluntary. Management-based regulation, by contrast, is
mandatory, just like other forms of regulation. For this reason, it has sometimes been
referred to as enforced or mandated self-regulation.10
II. Examples of Management-Based Regulation
Most management-based regulations require that regulated entities follow a
common management formula known as ‘plan-do-check-act’ which requires an
ongoing cycle of attention and continuous improvement.11 These regulations often
share key components, including requirements for risk analysis, evaluation of
management options, establishment of standard operating procedures, training in
internal operating procedures, documentation of adherence to procedures, and
monitoring and auditing. We offer examples of management-based regulation to show
the diverse policy domains within which management-based regulation has become an
important instrument for tackling public policy problems.
A. Preventing pollution
To reduce chemical emissions from power plants and manufacturing facilities,
regulation has traditionally focused on mandating pollution control technologies or
meeting emissions limits.12 It has focused on halting the release of pollution, not
explicitly discouraging facilities from using the very chemicals that create pollution in
the first place. In contrast, management-based regulation has sought to encourage
9

Darren Sinclair, ‘Self-Regulation versus Command and Control? Beyond False Dichotomies’ (1997)
19 L & Policy 529-559.
10
John Braithwaite, ‘Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control’ (1982)
80(7) Mich L Rev 1466-1507; Eugene Bardach and Robert A. Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem
of Regulatory Unreasonableness (Temple University Press 1982); Joseph Rees, ‘Self -Regulation: An
Effective Alternative to Direct Regulation by OSHA?’ (1988) 16(3) Policy Studies J 602-614; Bridget
M Hutter, Regulation and Risk: Occupational Health and Safety on the Railways (OUP 2001); Robyn
Fairman and Charlotte Yapp, ‘Enforced Self-Regulation, Prescription, and Conceptions of Compliance
within Small Businesses: The Impact of Enforcement’ (2005) 27 L & Policy 491-519.
11
W Edwards Deming, Out of the Crisis (MIT, Center for Advanced Engineering Study 1986) 88;
Ronald D. Moen and Clifford L. Norman, ‘Circling Back: Clearing Up Myths about the Deming Cycle
and Seeing How It Keeps Evolving’ (2010) 43 Quality Progress 22.
12
David Schoenbrod, Richard B. Stewart and Katrina M. Wyman, Breaking the Logjam: Environmental
Protection That Will Work (Yale University Press 2010) 3-29.
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pollution prevention by mandating that industrial facilities’ managers engage in
planning aimed at getting their operations to reduce their use of toxic chemicals.13 For
example, the Massachusetts Toxic Use Reduction Act (TURA) requires facilities’
managers to engage in analysis and planning to reduce their facilities’ use of toxic
materials—even though it does not actually mandate that any facility actually reduce
the use or emissions of toxics. Instead, regulated firms must engage in toxic use
analysis, create toxic use reduction plans, and submit annual reports identifying the
toxics their operations used, released as waste products, and included in the final
products manufactured. Over a dozen other states have adopted similar pollution
prevention planning laws.14
B. Avoiding chemical explosions
In the unlikely event of an accident in a facility employing large volumes of
chemicals, the consequences can be catastrophic—including loss of life, damage to
property, and vast contamination to the environment and natural resources. The
accident at the Union Carbide facility in Bhopal, India in 1984—which resulted in
thousands of fatalities—spurred regulators to put in place new regulations aimed at
preventing similar incidents from occurring.15 In the United States, Congress called for
a management-based regulatory approach, and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) responded
by issuing management-based rules: OSHA’s Process Safety Management (PSM), and
EPA’s Risk Management Planning (RMP).16 Echoing the commonalities of other
management-based regulations, both OSHA’s and EPA’s approaches involve similar
steps: hazard analysis, risk ranking, identification of risk reduction interventions,
development of operating and emergency procedures, continuous review and
improvement, documentation, and regular auditing.
C. Ensuring food safety
About forty-eight million people become sick as a result of food contamination
each year in the United States—with an estimated 128,000 hospitalizations and 3,000
deaths annually.17 Foodborne illnesses, however, are usually preventable.18 Although
13

Lori S Bennear, ‘Are Management-based Regulations Effective? Evidence from State Pollution
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City, 15 August 1985) <https://nyti.ms/29pGKL9> accessed 4 February 2019; Charlene Crabb,
‘Revising the Bhopal Tragedy’ (2004) 306 Science 1670-1671.
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accessed 13 January 2019.
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food safety regulation has traditionally centered on the inspection of food processing
facilities by inspectors’ looking and smelling for rotten or contaminated food, this
approach has proven incapable of detecting the microscopic sources of
contamination—the bacteria, viruses, and microbes that cause the majority of
illnesses.19 Moreover, the variety and size of food-processing facilities further make
comprehensive government inspection difficult. Management-based regulation has
offered a viable and widely implemented alternative in the form of Hazard Analysis
Critical Control Point (HACCP) regulations.20 Today, food safety regulations in the
United States, Europe, and other advanced economies follow the HACCP model.21
HACCP regulations call on food businesses to identify the sources of hazardous
conditions and articulate the best ways to prevent harm from occurring. Although
different subsets of the food sector—for example seafood, fruit juice, and meat
processing, as well as retail and food service operations—have somewhat different
management requirements, all HACCP regulations include seven core, mandated
activities: (1) conduct a hazards analysis; (2) identify critical control points (CCPs); (3)
set limits for CCPs; (4) monitor CCPs; (5) pursue corrective action when CCPs exceed
critical limits; (6) perform continuous assessment of CCPs and critical limits; (7)
Document procedures and implementation.22
D. Promoting security at high-hazard facilities
The terrorism events of September 11, 2001 raised concern about the security
of major parts of the United States’ critical infrastructure, including the vulnerability
of nuclear reactors and large chemical facilities.23 Regulators at the US Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) turned to management-based regulation in an effort to spur
such potential targets to managing the security aspects of their operations in a more
thorough manner.24 Under DHS requirements, for example, major facilities operating
with hazardous materials must engage in “vulnerability assessments” and then develop
plans and procedures that aim to improve the security of their operations.25 These plans
must include security measures designed to resist different methods of terrorist
violence, including cyberattacks, and must include procedures for maintaining
19

Peter May, ‘Social Regulation,’ in Lester M. Salamon, The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New
Governance 156-185 (OUP 2002).
20
Coglianese and Lazer, (n 1).
21
Ibid; David Lazer, ‘Regulatory interdependence and international governance,’ (2001) 8(3) J of Eur
Pub Policy 474-492; Ladina Caduff and Thomas Bernauer, ‘Managing Risk and Regulation in European
Food Safety Governance’ (2006) 23(1) Rev of Policy Research 153-168.
22
Sara Mortimore and Carol Wallace, HAACP: A Practical Approach (3rd edn, Springer 2013) 1.
23
PBS NOW with Bill Moyers, ‘Science and Health: Homeland Insecurity’ (PBS, 21 March 2003)
<https://www.pbs.org/now/science/chemsafe.html> accessed 13 January 2019; PBS NOW with Bill
Moyers, ‘Science and Health: Nuclear Plant Security’ (PBS, 2 December 2005)
<https://www.pbs.org/now/science/nuclearsafetyupdate.html> accessed 13 January 2019.
24
Department of Homeland Security, 2007. ‘Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards,’ Federal
Register 72:17688-17745.
25
Ibid.
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monitoring and security alarm system.26 The DHS requires that facilities’ vulnerability
assessments and security plans be submitted to the government for review and
approval.27
E. Preventing offshore oil spills
Following the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster in 2010, the federal government
adopted a management-based regulation intended to reduce the risks of accidents and
spills during offshore oil drilling. The Bureau of Ocean and Energy Management,
Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) within the U.S. Department of Interior turned
to a set of safety and environmental management standards (SEMS) that an oil industry
trade association, the American Petroleum Institute (API), had adopted and required its
members follow. The Department of Interior incorporated the API standards into
federal law, making them legally binding on all offshore drilling operations. The
departmental regulation requires drilling operators to put in place a comprehensive
safety management system which includes, among other things, a hazards analysis,
safety plan, operating procedures, training, emergency response plans, auditing, and
documentation. The government requires managers at these operations to “[e]stablish
goals and performance measures, demand accountability for implementation, and
provide necessary resources, … [a]ppoint management representatives who are
responsible for establishing, implementing and maintaining an effective SEMS
program, … review the SEMS program to determine if it continues to be suitable,
adequate and effective, …. and document the observations, conclusions and
recommendations of that review.”28 In addition, companies are required to notify
BOEMRE thirty days in advance of each internal audit of their SEMS, so as to allow
BOEMRE inspectors to participate in the audit as well.
III. Management-Based Regulation,
Non-State ‘Regulators,’ and Global Governance
All of our examples are of regulations adopted or agreed to by governmental
bodies, but, as the example of BOEMRE’s incorporation of industry standards for
SEMS shows, management-based regulation is not only a strategy that can be adopted
by governmental regulators; it can also be a tool employed by private actors.29 Trade
associations can use management standards to seek to control individual firms in their
sector; multinational corporations can use them to oversee their individual facilities or
those of their suppliers; and non-governmental organizations seeking to shape the
26
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behavior of private actors can adopt them and encourage their use. For example,
General Motors and Ford have demanded that their suppliers implement environmental
management systems.30 A major non-governmental organization, the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO), has adopted a series of criteria for
environmental management systems—the so-called ISO 14000 series—that have been
widely implemented around the world.31 Closer to home, HACCP-like requirements
have formed part of an innovative public-private partnership to improve food safety for
fresh produce. The California Leafy Greens Product Handler Marketing Agreement
(LGMA) brings regulators together with handlers buying eighteen distinct leafy green
vegetables to determine best practices for mitigating food safety at the point of farm
production, enforced via commitments by handler-members to deal only with growers
compliant with LGMA standards and on-site auditing conducted by state inspectors.32
Moving from private or public-private initiatives to the broadest scale of
international cooperation, management-based regulation has proven at times to be an
attractive model for multinational efforts to address global problems. For example, the
2015 Paris Agreement on climate change includes the “core elements of managementbased regulation”:
Countries submit their own mitigation plans; they agree to follow certain
transparency guidelines in connection with their progress in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions; and they commit to taking stock in five-year
intervals to strive for improvements. Substitute “nations” for “businesses”
and it is clear that this is classic management-based regulation.33
Much like with national or subnational examples of management-based regulation, the
Paris Agreement does not impose any binding performance standards on nation-states
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions; instead each participating government agrees
to develop its own commitments and plans.
IV. When To Use Management-Based Regulation
Before deciding to use management-based regulation, decision-makers must
first determine if there is a need for regulation at all. Assuming an affirmative answer,
30

Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash, ‘Management-Based Strategies: An Emerging Approach to
Environmental Protection,’ in Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash (eds.), Leveraging the Private Sector:
Management-Based Strategies for Improving Environmental Performance 10 –11 (Resources for the
Future Press 2013).
31
Aseem Prakash and Matthew Potoski, The Voluntary Environmentalists: Green Clubs, ISO 14001,
and Voluntary Environmental Regulations (CUP 2006).
32
Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, ‘Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization as a Response
to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering’ (2012) 110(7) Mich L Rev 1265-1308.
33
Cary Coglianese, ‘When Management-Based Regulation Goes Global,’ The Regulatory Review 12
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the next question then becomes whether to use a management-based approach or one
of its main alternatives: means-based or performance-based regulation.
Means standards may offer greater certainty of effectiveness and tend to be easier
for inspectors to monitor for compliance, because they are clear and uniform. Yet, due to
these same qualities, they can be a blunt and costly way to regulate. By contrast,
performance standards impose an obligation on regulated entities to achieve a desired
outcome, granting firms flexibility to search out better and cheaper solutions. It can,
however, sometimes be quite difficult to operationalize the outcome into a regulatory
standard that is actually enforceable, and monitoring outcomes may involve prohibitive
costs. For example, when the outcome desired is the avoidance of a low-probability
catastrophe or terrorist incident, then traditional performance standards may be unrealistic.
The disadvantages of means and performance standards may not be intrinsic to
these approaches to regulation but rather more of a function of the resource
constraints—both financial and informational—under which regulators operate. If
regulators actually faced no resource constraints, they could craft means standards that
fit precisely with each individual firm’s operations, or they could craft perfectly
calibrated performance goals that could be effortlessly and fully monitored. Yet
because regulators do face real resource constraints, the key factors in choosing
between means, performance, or management standards largely hinge on factors related
to those resource constraints. If it is easy to define and monitor outcomes, then
performance standards will make an excellent choice. If all the firms to be covered by
a regulation are the same in all relevant respects, then a one-size-fits-all means-based
approach will make sense.
But some regulatory problems are ones where the firms to be regulated are quite
heterogeneous and where it is difficult either to define or monitor outcomes. For those
problems, management-based regulation offers a promising alternative. By mandating
that each firm regulate itself from the inside, firms can choose the means of solving
problems that are appropriate to their operations and they can even find and designate
relevant proxies that can be measured for outcomes that could be difficult to measure.
HACCP, for example, not only calls upon firms to find appropriate means for
preventing pathogen growth during food production (by hand washing, for example),
but they must also identify critical control points where contamination can occur and
find ways to measure how well those control points are being managed (for example,
periodically swabbing certain pieces of equipment and testing for pathogen growth).
It is possible, of course, that some aspects of a regulatory problem or some parts
of a firm’s operations will be amenable to means or performance standards, while
management standards could still be usefully applied. In other words, management
standards can be both substitutes for as well as complements to means and performance
standards. In the domain of food safety, for example, means and performance standards
can be used. Every food producer needs to use refrigeration for storage (means) and
some limited number of food samples can be pulled off the production line and tested
for pathogens (performance). But since exposure to just a single e coli bacterium can
cause severe health effects, no sampling strategy can be complete, and reliance solely
on a performance standard would not provide sufficient assurance of food safety.
8

In addition, some problems or facets of problems might be said to stem more
immediately from poor quality management itself. For example, to protect workers
from factory fires, regulation calling for the adoption of particular technology—such
as sprinkler systems or unlocked emergency exits—will likely make great sense for all
facilities. Yet, technology will not, on its own, likely ensure that workers will know
how to escape that same factory safely—such as knowing where the nearest exits are
to their workstations, how to avoid smoke inhalation, or how to file out safely and seek
help. These other steps require thinking and planning—or at least the creation of plans
and training—to prepare people and manage their behavioral responses in the event of
a low-probability but high consequence event like a factory fire. Because regulatory
problems like accidents can also sometimes occur because the moving parts in a
complex industrial process are not well-coordinated and managed,34 managementbased regulation will be promising as it aims at the root cause of those problems.35
V. Design Choices in Management-Based Regulation
If a regulator decides to establish management standards, it will face a series of
design choices, including:
•
•
•
•

Whether to mandate planning only or the implementation of plans too;
What level of detail to provide in the criteria for a mandated plan;
Whether to require review and approval of plans in advance of any
granting of a permit or license to operate a regulated facility or sell
products or services; and
What requirements to impose for record keeping and auditing.

The discussion below highlights these design questions, noting that the choices to be
made with respect to specific problems may need to vary in different regulatory contexts.
A. What to Mandate?
Sometimes a management-based regulation will mandate planning only, as with
the Massachusetts TURA, while other times, as with HACCP, both planning and the
implementation of a plan will be mandatory. Deciding what to mandate will depend on
other incentives facing the firm. For example, even though TURA does not require
firms to implement their plans nor actually to reduce their use of toxic chemicals,
researchers Monica Becker and Ken Geiser have reported that eighty percent of the
firms they surveyed had implemented at least part of their mandated toxic use reduction

34
35

Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies. (PUP 2011).
Coglianese (n 2).
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plans, presumably because in the course of planning they found ways to lower their
costs by reducing their use of toxics.36
Firms will generally not need to be required to implement their plans whenever
managers suffer from a myopia that leads them to underestimate their expected net
benefits from planning and implementation. Even if they do estimate these private net
benefits correctly (and they are still too low to justify action), once firms have sunk
costs into planning (because they were mandated to do so), they may then find
sufficient benefits to justify going forward to implement once the required planning is
completed. In some instances, the mere documentation of problems in a plan may give
rise to a background risk of tort liability to a firm if it fails to implement its plan, a legal
incentive that may be sufficient to induce implementation without any additional
regulatory compulsion.
If firms lack any background incentive to implement their plans, then
mandating implementation should be considered. Yet, before making plan
implementation mandatory, one of the potential disadvantages of such a mandate
should be taken into account. If firms are required to implement their plans (or face
background tort liability to do so), they may well plan less thoroughly or ambitiously
than they would otherwise. Plans that must be implemented, after all, may become
plans that are easily achievable. If what is really needed to solve a problem is to
motivate managers to probe their operations thoroughly and to create stretch goals, and
if there is some expectation that if they gain greater awareness of the problem they will
have a positive reason to fix it, then it will likely be better not to require implementation
of mandated plans.
B. Specificity of management criteria
When designing management standards, regulators need to choose how to
specify the required management steps. Some requirements are very general. TURA,
for instance, calls only for a “comprehensive economic and technical evaluation of
appropriate technologies, procedures, and training programs for potentially achieving
toxics use reduction.”37 By contrast, EPA’s RMP rule dictates that firms prepare “clear
instructions or steps” addressing:
(1) initial startup; (2) normal operations; (3) temporary operations; (4)
emergency shutdown operations; (5) normal shutdown; (6) startup
following a normal or emergency shutdown or a major change that
requires a hazard review; (7) consequences of deviations and steps
required to correct or avoid deviations; and (8) equipment inspections.38
36

Monica Becker and Ken Geiser, ‘Evaluating Progress: A Report on the Findings of the Massachusetts
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The degree of specificity will likely depend on how well understood the problem is and
how confident the regulator is about what quality management related to that problem
will entail. The greater the heterogeneity in firms and in the relationship between their
management and the underlying problem, the less specific a management standards’
prescriptions likely should be.
C. The role for the regulator in planning
As noted above, the DHS’s anti-terrorism planning regulation requires covered
facilities to submit their vulnerability assessments and security plans to the government
for review and approval before they can be considered final. This is a more common
approach in Europe with a form of management-based regulation known as “safety
case” regulation.39 By contrast, other management-based regulations require firms to
submit a management plan to the government, but not for approval (for example, EPA’s
RMP regulation). Still other management standards simply call for the required plan
and other documentation to be kept on file and made available upon request by
government inspectors (for example, the Food and Drug Administration’s HACCP).
Which of these options to select will depend on the factors such as the time and
resources available to the regulator to review plans as well as the regulator’s confidence
in its ability to assess quality planning.
D. Record keeping and auditing
It is hard to find examples of management standards that do not require any
documentation; on the contrary, the preparation of analysis documents, plans,
procedures, checklists, forms, and audit trails are common to management standards.
But these requirements can vary, depending on the extent and frequency of
documentation and reporting required. So too can management standards vary in the
nature and frequency of auditing required by the firm itself or by third-party auditors.
If third-party auditing is required, the regulator will need to contemplate how to ensure
the credibility of these auditors, in terms of requirements for auditor accreditation as
well as the degree to which the regulator will engage in ongoing auditing of the
auditors.40
VI. The Impact of Management-Based Regulation
Given that management-based regulation has been adopted to tackle a range of
policy problems, assessing the impact of such standards will be important for
39

National Academy of Sciences (n 6), at 77-84, 109.
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determining whether they are working and can reliably form part of other regulators’
toolkits and under what conditions.41 Some fragmentary evidence suggests that
management standards have made a positive contribution in reducing some of the
problems they have aimed to address. For example, for at least the first several years
after the federal government mandated HACCP to address food safety, cases of major
bacterial foodborne illnesses declined by more than twenty percent.42 Controlling for
production levels, chemical firms in Massachusetts reduced their use of toxic chemicals
by forty-one percent for nearly a decade after TURA’s adoption and dropped their
emissions of toxic chemicals by over eighty-five percent.43 In the chemical industry,
property insurance claims declined by forty percent following the introduction of risk
management planning regulation.44 However, other research indicates only a more
“modest decline in reported accident frequency and worker injury rates.”45
Whatever one makes of these temporal changes in indicators of regulatory
problems, it is difficult to attribute these measurable improvements to managementbased regulation in particular—as opposed to other possible factors contributing to
improvements during the same periods. For example, with respect to the Massachusetts
TURA, toxic releases in many other states in New England declined by similar amounts
during the same time period. To overcome this limitation, Lori Bennear undertook a
differences-in-differences analysis of a panel dataset of about 31,000 facilities during
the period 1988-1999. 46 She compared toxic chemical releases at facilities located in
the fourteen states with toxic pollution planning laws to releases at plants located in
states without such laws. She found that facilities subject to laws requiring
management-based regulation decreased their overall releases of toxic chemicals to a
greater extent—on average thirty percent more (60,000 pounds)—than facilities not
subject to similar regulations. Notably, she also found evidence that facilities subject
to the planning laws also engaged more frequently in activities related to pollution
prevention. She did find, however, that the differences across the two groups of
facilities disappeared after about six years, suggesting the possibility that management
standards encourage firms to find low-hanging fruit but that over time the benefits they
deliver will decline. This finding is not inconsistent with a concern that firms can
sometimes respond to management requirements as rote, paperwork exercises, rather
than earnest efforts to self-regulate.
41
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Another set of concerns about management-based regulation centers on the
government’s ability to provide adequate enforcement oversight and other incentives
for compliance. It is possible that the very same reason that management-based
regulation may be attractive to regulators—namely, they lack any clearly effective
means and cannot easily test outcomes—may ironically make it more difficult to
enforce management-based regulation. Regulators may also need to re-train its
inspectors, as the skills for evaluating a robust risk management plan will be different
than the skills needed to determine if facilities are operating mandated equipment.
These enforcement challenges may contribute to levels of compliance that are deemed
to be low. In the area of seafood HACCP regulation, for example, the Food and Drug
Administration has reported that a majority of fish processors have failed to develop
plans in full compliance with the regulation.47 Similarly, the USDA conducted an indepth study of forty-seven processing plants subject to HACCP requirements and found
that the vast majority of those plants (forty-four) were in significant violation of
HACCP standards.48 The Government Accountability Office (GAO), among others,
have likewise reported concerns that food safety challenges persist in select facilities
where HACCP-based approaches have been implemented—and that the USDA had not
gathered sufficient data to evaluate the performance of this approach over time at select
meat processing facilities.49
A related concern, as alluded to already, is that firms may have incentives
simply to “go through the motions” with management-based regulation, especially if
enforcement oversight is weak. Although management-based regulation does present
attractive opportunities for firms to use the flexibility afforded to them responsibly to
find lower-cost solutions to public problems, these same firms also have opportunities
to engage in rote compliance and not search very hard for hidden hazards or solutions
to them that would be inconvenient or burdensome. Bridget Hutter found that the
British railway services “paid more attention to the letter rather than spirit of the law”
when implementing management-based safety regulations.50
Similarly, Neil
Gunningham and Darren Sinclair found “ritualistic responses or resistant subcultures”
at some facilities in their study of the Australian mining industry’s response to
management-based safety regulation. 51
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A final concern about management-based regulation is that it can be far too
burdensome on small businesses.52 Large firms will be much more likely to have the
capacity for engaging in their own risk analysis and internal planning. Although it is
possible that any kind of regulation could contribute to firm consolidation and serve as
a barrier to competition, management-based regulation may place disproportionate
burdens on smaller firms and exacerbate any potential anti-competitive effects of
regulation.
VII. Issues for the Future Study of Management-Based Regulation
We started this chapter by noting that management-based regulation has been
used much more frequently than it has been studied. Interest in its role in the regulator’s
toolkit shows no signs of abating, and the theoretical work on this form of regulation
would indicate that regulators’ interest stems from management-based regulation’s
suitability for a range of problems where there exist no one-size-fits-all solutions and
where outcomes are difficult to measure. Many problems, especially those with lowprobability but high-hazard consequences, fit into this niche. This niche is also one for
which it happens to be difficult to evaluate management-based regulation’s impact, for
it is difficult to evaluate any regulatory intervention’s impact in addressing problems
that occur only infrequently. In short, the very same challenges that might appear to
justify regulators’ interest in management-based regulation, namely its availability
when outcomes are difficult to assess, will invariably present a challenge to researchers
seeking to evaluate management-based regulation’s efficacy.
In addition to the need for additional research on management standards’ impact
on regulatory outcomes, three related issues constitute worthwhile avenues for future
research. First, given the various design choices available to regulators when
establishing management standards, future research could do more to illuminate which
of these design elements are more important and under what conditions. We know far
too little about how management standards get implemented and about whether
regulatory authorities find ways to develop the needed human capital to assess quality
risk analysis and management planning to determine whether firms are fulfilling their
management-based regulatory responsibilities.
Second, most management standards follow a linear, engineering model of how
management should function. As illustrated by the examples highlighted earlier in this
chapter, most of these standards adhere to a rational, plan-do-check-act model and rely
on formal procedures and documentation. But what if ‘good management’ requires
something different than (or in addition to) this kind of engineering tidiness? Robin Ely
and Debra Meyerson show how one offshore oil extraction company saw its accident
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rate decline by eighty-four percent following the introduction of an intensive sensitivity
and communication training for its workers that helped them break down some of their
gendered patterns of behavior.53 Perhaps interventions along these lines would do more
to improve management and the attainment of regulatory goals than mandating the
implementation of formal management ‘systems.’
Finally, researchers would do well to investigate how well management-based
regulation scales up and down, and how well it works when adopted voluntarily by the
private sector. We know too little about how management-based standards established
by nongovernmental institutions fare compared with binding management-based
regulations established by governmental authorities. We should also await insights
from how the Paris Agreement works in order to understand better the potential for
management-based global governance strategies. The international agreement reached
in Paris in late 2015 has been heralded as a breakthrough due to its ‘bottom-up’
approach that parallels management-based regulation.54 It will require some time to see
how well this approach works at the global scale, but fruitful avenues for future
research may only increase to the extent that other international agreements also follow
a management-based model.
Conclusion
Management-based regulation has been relatively overlooked in the literature
on regulatory instrument choice, but given that it is being applied in practice to address
important and diverse public problems, researchers should pay more attention to it.
Existing research shows why regulations that call for internal analysis and planning are
likely to be an appropriate response to some of the most vexing problems that other
regulatory approaches are unable to address, including those where there exist no onesize-fits-all solutions and where it is difficult to assess outcomes. Research also reveals
the range of important design choices that call for regulators to take into account firms’
existing incentives for planning and implementation, as well as to consider other factors
likely to affect management-based regulation’s effectiveness. In the end, managementbased regulation has been demonstrated to make a positive difference in at least some
domains, but questions remain about its long-term efficacy, its suitability for smaller
firms, and how well its linear and hierarchical approach to organizational management
holds up over time.
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